University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy
Volume 15

Issue 1

Article 6

2003

American Anti-Terrorism Planning and Design Strategies:
Applications for Florida Growth Management, Comprehensive
Planning and Urban Design
Richard H. Schneider

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jlpp

Recommended Citation
Schneider, Richard H. (2003) "American Anti-Terrorism Planning and Design Strategies: Applications for
Florida Growth Management, Comprehensive Planning and Urban Design," University of Florida Journal of
Law & Public Policy: Vol. 15: Iss. 1, Article 6.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jlpp/vol15/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

ESSAY
AMERICAN ANTI-TERRORISM PLANNING AND DESIGN
STRATEGIES: APPLICATIONS FOR FLORIDA GROWTH
MANAGEMENT, COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING AND
URBAN DESIGN
Richard H. Schneider*
I.

INTRODUCTION ....................................

130

II.

DEFINITIONS OF TERMS ..............................

131
131
132
132

A. Anti-Terrorism vs. Counter-Terrorism ...............
B. Preventive Measures .............................
C. Responsive Measures .............................
III.

ANTI-TERRORISM PLANNING AND DESIGN AND PLACE-BASED

CRIME PREVENTION PLANNING ........................

A. Defensible Space ................................
B. Crime Prevention Through EnvironmentalDesign
(CPTED) ......................................
C. Situational Crime Prevention ......................
IV.

GENERAL ORIENTATIONS AND PHILOSOPHIES .............

A.
B.
C.
D.

Changingthe Target .............................
Decentralizingthe Target .........................
"Let Cities Be Cities" . ...........................
Hardeningthe Target .............................

V.

PLANNING FOR UNCERTAIN FUTURES: RISK ASSESSMENT ...

VI.

WHY INCORPORATE ANTI-TERRORISM PLANNING INTO
GROWTH MANAGEMENT AND COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING

134
135
135
138
139
140
140
141
142
144

IN FLORIDA? ....................................... 148

* Ph.D., Political Science/Public Administration, University of Florida, 1981; Professor,
Department of Urban & Regional Planning, University of Florida; Member of AICP. This Essay
was prepared for the Nelson Symposium on Growth Management Legislation, September 2002, at
the Fredric G. Levin College of Law.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW& PUBLIC POLICY

VII.

WHERE

[Vol. 15

DOES ANTI-TERRORISM PLANNING FIT INTO EXISTING

FLORIDA LEGISLATION

..............................

VIII. CONCLUSION ......................................

151

153

I. INTRODUCTION

Whether cloaked in economic, religious, or political guises,
government planning, land use, and growth management policies over the
past five decades have often been catalysts of terrorist violence in the
Middle East, Northern Ireland, Africa, and across the Indian Subcontinent.
It is only recently, however, that a progression of terrorist attacks against
Americans' has caused academics as well as planning, design, and legal
practitioners to begin seriously examining the role that these endeavors
play in preventing or deterring terrorist events and in responding to the
consequences of those events when they do occur.
This Essay examines anti-terrorism and anti-terrorist strategies and
practices that might be compatible with Florida's existing growth
management and planning legislation and practice. After defining relevant
terms and issues, providing a background of emerging viewpoints,
considering available risk assessment approaches, and reviewing relevant
evidence from survey research and other jurisdictions that have been
victimized by terrorism, this Essay suggests anti-terrorist strategies and
policies that ought to be considered for inclusion in Florida's fundamental
growth management and comprehensive planning laws.
While the state has compulsory emergency management planning for
every county,2 Florida has no provision in the State's Comprehensive
Plan,3 in the Growth Management portion of the plan,4 or among the
mandatory or optional elements of its comprehensive planning legislation
requiringjurisdictions to think through anti-terrorism growth management,
planning, or related urban design possibilities.' This is so despite the
preamble to chapter 252, Florida Statutes, which states:

1. Beirut, Lebanon, Marine Barracks (1983); New York City, World Trade Center (1993);
Oklahoma City, Murrah Building (1995); Dharan, Saudi Arabia, Khobar Towers (1996); Dar es
Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya, American Embassies (1998); Aden, Yemen, U.S.S. Cole
(2000); New York City, World Trade Center (2001). Note this is a list of major attacks only.
2. See FLA. STAT. § 252.35(2)(b) (2002).
3. See FLA. STAT. ch. 187 (2002).
4. See FLA. STAT. § 186.009 (2002).
5. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3177 (2002).
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The Legislature finds and declares that the state is vulnerable to a wide
range of emergencies, including natural, technological, and manmade
disasters, all of which threaten the life, health, and safety of its people;
damage and destroy property; disrupt services and everyday business and
recreational activities; and impede economic growth and development.
The Legislature further finds that this vulnerability is exacerbated by the
tremendous growth in the state's population, especially the growth in the
number of persons residing in coastal areas, in the elderly population, in
the number of seasonal vacationers, and in the number of persons with
special needs. This growth has greatly complicated the state's ability to
coordinate its emergency management resources and activities.6
Building anti-terrorism planning and growth management provisions
into existing state law will provide Florida with valuable tools with which
to help prevent, deter, and respond to terrorist attack and to mitigate its
effects. 7 Moreover, it would help the state better coordinate a
comprehensive approach to emergency management that is only slowly
emerging following September 11. Prior to that date, these issues and the
linkages between growth management, comprehensive planning and antiterrorism were rarely raised in Florida or in the United States, but now
they are becoming much more salient as we struggle to respond to the
reality and fear of terrorism.
II. DEFINITIONS OF TERMS
A. Anti-Terrorism vs. Counter-Terrorism
Anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism are sometimes confused. Antiterrorism refers primarily to defensive measures that can be taken to
protect people and property from terrorist acts, whereas counter-terrorism
refers primarily to offensive measures to combat terrorism.' The latter
category is the province of federal agencies such as the Department of
Defense, the FBI, and the CIA. The former category includes a wide

6. FLA. STAT. § 252.311(1) (2002).
7. This is so, we believe, despite the convincing argument that existing planning and growth
management legislation, though good in theory, is badly flawed in implementation. See, e.g.,
Thomas G. Pelham, RestructuringFlorida'sGrowth ManagementSystem: AlternativeApproaches
to PlanImplementation and Concurrency, 12 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 299 (2001).
8. See IntegratingHuman-CausedHazards Into Mitigation Planning: Guide Number Seven,
FEMA Doc. 386-7 (2002), available at http://www.fema.gov/fima/planning toc6.shtm (last visited
Oct. 27, 2003) (The author helped edit the document for the agency).
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variety of activities, including growth management, comprehensive
planning, and micro-level urban design activities. These anti-terrorism
activities can be utilized by state and local governments as well as by
private individuals to defend against terrorist attack.
Terrorism itself has been variously defined by different federal and
international agencies. One widely used definition is "the unlawful use of
force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a
government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance
of political or social objectives." 9 To this, one must add religious
objectives.
Within the realm of anti-terrorism planning, there are two general
categories of action and a third that crosses both categories. The first is
preventive measures and the second is responsive measures. The third type
of action, mitigation, applies to both prevention and response.
B. Preventive Measures
Preventive strategy, in the context of anti-terrorism land use and urban
design, is epitomized by the National Capital Planning Commission's
recently released plan for Washington, D.C.'s monumental core area,10
which contains a large number of potential terrorist targets. This plan
suggests a range of zoning, transportation, and street-level design changes
aimed at melding security with aesthetics." Effective preventive strategy
can mitigate a terrorist attack by minimizing damage to targets or by
displacing the attack to other less vulnerable but also less desirable targets
(from the perpetrator's point of view). 2
C. Responsive Measures
Responsive measures include, but are not limited to, policy planning
that minimizes the effects (especially long-term) of a terrorist attack on the
rebuilding of property and the reintegration of affected or damaged areas
into the fabric ofthe existing community. One example is the planning and

9. 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(1) (2003).
10. National Capital Planning Commission, The National Capital Urban Design and Security
Plan, Oct. 2002, availableathttp://www.ncpc.gov/publicationspress/publications.html (last visited
Nov. 21, 2003).
11. See infra Parts III.B, IV.D.
12. The concept of target displacement is controversial to be sure and there is a growing body
of literature in the place-based crime prevention-planning field that deals with the practical
problems and ethics of displacement. See RICHARD SCHNEIDER & TED KITCHEN, PLANNING FOR
CRIME PREVENTION: A TRANS ATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE, 91-103 (RIPI Library Series) (2002).
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regeneration policies of the city of Manchester, England, in response to the
1996 IRA bomb attack that devastated the city's center. These policies
greatly expedited redevelopment efforts, and as a result, helped restore
public confidence in the viability of the urban core area. 3
In the private sector, response planning is epitomized by the
recommendations of a Rand report commissioned by the Building and
Managers Association of Greater Los Angeles (BOMA). The report
suggested policy and program changes by government and the private
sector to deter and mitigate the effects of a terrorist attack on the eighteen
high rise buildings (those over five hundred feet) in the city's central
business district. 4 The importance of private sector participation in antiterrorism planning and design is evidenced by the fact that approximately
eighty-five percent of the nation's infrastructure, including that which is
considered critical, is owned and operated by private enterprise. 5 A
significant portion of that critical infrastructure is located in the nation's
fourth largest state, Florida.
Most current anti-terrorism planning that involves growth management,
land use, or urban design issues focuses on one aspect of the so-called fullspectrum of threats. This spectrum includes attacks with chemical,
biological, nuclear, radiological, and explosive-incendiary (CBRNE)
devices. 6 This focus is on explosive devices carried in land or water
vehicles such as those used in all strikes against American targets (with the
exception of the September 11 hijackings, and the subsequent anthrax mail
attacks). These are widely seen as being most subject to deterrence and to
mitigation by state and local government or by the private sector. It is
acknowledged that little can be done at these levels to prevent or deter
attack from hijacked airlines or by most weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). 7 Rather, counter-terrorism and prevention of these types of
attacks are, for the most part, the province of federal military, law
enforcement and intelligence agencies, although responses to all types of

13. See Ted Kitchen, Planningin Response to Terrorism: The Case of Manchester, 18
ENGLAND J. ARcHrrEcTuRAL & PLAN. REs. 330 (2001).
14. RAE W. ARCHIBALD ET AL., SEcuRrrY AND SAFETY IN

Los ANGELES HIGH-RISE
BUILDINGS AFTER 9/11 (2002).
15. The National Strategy for Homeland Security: Office of Homeland Security Protecting
Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/ (last
visited Mar. 18, 2003). Critical infrastructure is defined as a system whose incapacity or destruction
would have a debilitating impact on the defense or economic security of the nation. See Critical
Infrastructure Assurance Office, at www.ciao.gov (last visited Mar. 18, 2003).
16. See IntegratingHuman-CausedHazards, supra note 8.
17. See 18 U.S.C. § 2332a (2003).
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attack generally are within the power (albeit not the financial abilities) of
local, regional, or state governments.
III. ANTI-TERRORISM PLANNING AND DESIGN AND PLACE-BASED
CRIME PREVENTION PLANNING

Anti-terrorism planning and design have increasingly borrowed
techniques and strategies from place-based crime prevention planning.
Place-based crime prevention planning has already been incorporated into
Florida urban planning and design through existing legislation.' 8 Other
forms of crime prevention research and practice focus on either offenders,
the legal system (including police, courts, and the correctional system), or
crime targets (people and property). Alternatively, place-based crime
prevention planning concentrates largely on the physical area(s) where
crimes occur.' 9 It involves asking questions: What about this place
attracted this crime? What is it that motivated the offender to act here?
Does the crime have to do with the design or management of the place? Is
the crime related to a specific use of the place or a certain timing relative
to the place? Could all the foregoing questions be relevant, in some
combination? Moreover, what can we do to "design out" crime here? Only
since the early 1970s have police, criminologists, planners, urban
designers, and architects begun to recognize the fundamental importance
that place plays in the criminal event.20 Indeed, this acknowledgment
caused one leading American crime researcher to question that since we
now know that future crime is six times more predictable by the address
of the occurrence than by the identity of the offender, why are we not
doing more about it? Why are we not thinking more about wheredunit
rather than just whodunit?"'
Despite its growing status among crime prevention strategies, placebased crime prevention does not play the dominant role in preventing or

18. See Safe Neighborhoods Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 163.501-166.522 (2002).
19. See generally P.J. BRANTINGHAM & P.L. BRANTINGHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL
CRIMINOLOGY (1981); RONALD V. CLARKE, SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION: SUCCESSFUL CASE
STUDIES (2d ed. 1997); C. RAY JEFFREY, CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN
(2d ed. 1977); OSCAR NEWMAN, DEFENSIBLE SPACE: CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH URBAN DESIGN
(1973).
20. See generally SCHNEIDER & KITCHEN, supra note 12.
21. L.W. Sherman, Hot Spots of Crime and Criminal Careers ofPlaces, in CRIMEAND PLACE
35, 36-37 (J.E. Eck & D. Wisburd eds., 1995). It is interesting to note that terrorists have twice
attacked the same target in the United States (the World Trade Center) and have repeatedly attacked
military, federal and diplomatic symbols of the nation.
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deterring crimes. Indeed, we know that most crimes are the result of a
combination of factors, and that the suitability (or unsuitability) of a place
is only one of these factors. Nevertheless, a growing body of empirical
evidence suggests that planning, designing, and managing places to deter
crime are effective strategies when implemented appropriately.22 Given
what we now know, it is foolhardy to ignore a tool in the battle against
crime (or anti-terrorism), even if its role is relatively minor. Moreover, in
an uncertain world, seemingly minor roles may assume major importance
in any given circumstance.
Over the past forty years, four primary theories have evolved to explain
crime in places and to devise strategies to design crime out of places.
These are the theories of defensible space, crime prevention through
environmental design (commonly known as CPTED), situational crime
prevention, and environmental criminology.23 The first three theories are
discussed below, leaving environmental criminology for a separate paper
as it is not as relevant to the present argument as are the other theories.
A. Defensible Space
The initial applications of defensible space were in residential areas,
primarily in public housing complexes across the nation. Though some
elements of the theory have been the subject of intense criticism, it
nevertheless strongly influenced the philosophies of the U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development as well as the British government in
their public (council) housing design and construction practices. As one
result, neither nation now supports building high-rise public housing
towers although this was once the norm in both countries.
B. Crime Prevention Through EnvironmentalDesign (CPTED)
A related approach, CPTED, was independently developed by C. Ray
Jeffrey as a theory of human learning,24 with specific applications relative
22. See generally SCHNEIDER & KITCHEN, supra note 12; J.E. Eck, Preventing Crime at
Places, in PREVENTING CRIME: WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN'T, WHAT'S PROMISING, A REPORT

TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 7-1 (L.W. Sherman et al. eds., 1997), available at
www.ncjrs.org/works/wholedoc.htm (last visited Dec. 23,2003); J.D. FEINSETAL., SOLVINGCRIME
PROBLEMS IN RESIDENTIAL NEIGHBORHOODS: COMPREHENSIVE CHANGES IN DESIGN,
MANAGEMENT AND USE (1997); M. FELSON & R. PEISER, REDUCING CRIME THROUGH REAL

ESTATE DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT (1998); L.W. Sherman et al., Preventing Crime: What
Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising, National Institute of Justice, Research in Brief (July
1998), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/171676.pdf (last visited Dec. 23, 2003).
23. See generally supra note 19. The four theories are the products of the authors listed.
24. See JEFFREY, supra note 19.
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to the interaction of people and the environment. Since the initial
articulation of CPTED in 1971, it has evolved to provide specific placebased crime prevention analysis techniques and strategies used by police
agencies, and increasingly by planning and land development departments,
throughout the United States and Britain. CPTED and defensible space
principles overlap in some areas, principally in the idea that human
territoriality is a powerful, albeit ambiguous, force that helps shape
behavior and that can be used to deter criminal activity in certain
circumstances.
Besides territoriality, other modem principles of CPTED include access
control, surveillance, activity generation, and placement, as well as
emphasis on the importance of appropriate property maintenance. Each
of these principles has numerous sub-elements. For instance, target
hardening and layered defenses are related to access control; lighting and
sight lines are components of surveillance.26 Moreover, aside from
intelligence gathering and dissemination functions that, as noted in Part II,
are the primary responsibilities of federal intelligence and law enforcement
agencies, these principles remain key aspects of most defensive antiterrorist planning.27
At the building and site level, CPTED principles are often
operationalized in military installations or in other key federal facilities.
This may include the design of structures that minimize niches (hiding
places) around the building envelope; the maximization of surveillance of
exterior entrances and parking areas through window placement (a natural
design element); electronic means, or guards; the protection of delivery
areas remote from the main structure; the establishment of sufficient standoff distances from parking areas and vehicle traffic; the design of
curvilinear entrance drives;2" and the placement of hardened street
furniture or, where feasible, indigenous plant and landscape materials that

25. See SCHNEIDER& KITCHEN, supra note 12, at 91-103.
26. The author has used these principles in helping to devise an anti-terrorist land
development and design plan for a Department of Defense facility at the Key West Naval Air
Station. The plan is currently being implemented by the DOD. See ALAN MATHER, DESIGNING
TROUBLE AWAY, SECURITY MANAGEMENT (2002) (documenting this project).
27. See, e.g., Protectionof DOD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and
PoliticalTurbulence, DOD Doc. 0-2000.12-H (1993); see also Juliana Prevatt, Crime Prevention
Through Environmental Design (CPTED) and the Role of Facilities Planning in Force Protection
(1998) (Terminal Project, Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of Florida) (on
file with the Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of Florida).
28. Curvilinear drives minimize the ability of vehicles to gather speed and momentum.
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are effective vehicle deterrents.29 The buildings themselves may be
hardened against blast (as new or modernized American embassies are
presently), or they may contain a blast wall and blast resistant windows.
The site may be zoned so as to group or disperse particularly sensitive
facilities or infrastructure and to contain layers of access control devices.
These feature outgrowths of CPTED principles are adaptable, in total
or in part, to many other applications in the urban civilian context. In that
respect, a key goal is to skillfully blend them into the environment so that
the CPTED principles are part and parcel of the existing urban fabric and
citizens do not feel like they are living or working in a fortress. Indeed,
these are the guiding principles behind the National Capital Planning
Commission's new security plan for Washington, D.C. The plan proposes
that the component streetscape elements, such as trees, shrubbery, and
other vegetative materials, connect with manmade elements to produce
barriers that are effective against attacks from vehicles, yet are pleasing to
the eye.3"
CPTED principles are presently incorporated into Florida law through
Florida Statute Section 163.513 of the Safe Neighborhoods Act, titled
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Functions of
Neighborhood Improvement Districts. The substantive heart of this
legislation provides for:
an analysis of crimes related to land use and environmental and physical
conditions of the district, giving particular attention to factors which
support or create opportunities for crime, which impede natural
surveillance, which encourage free circulation through the district, or
which hinder the defense of social territories perceived by residents as
under control. Any factor used to define or describe the conditions of the
physical environment can serve as a basis of a crime-to-environment
relationship. These factors include streets, alleys, sidewalks, residential
blocks, position of dwellings on a block, single vs. multifamily dwellings,
abandoned houses, parking areas and parking lots, informal pathways,
functional areas of the environment, traffic flow patterns, and the
existence of barriers such as fences, walls, gullies and thick vegetation."
The intent of the Act, first promulgated in 1987, was to help rescue
deteriorating urban neighborhoods, specifically those that demonstrated
crime problems. Originally budgeted with $1.6 million and with
implementation authority placed in the Department of Community Affairs,

29. See MATHER, supranote 26; see also Curt P. Betts, MitigatingTerroristAttack Through
EnvironmentalDESIGN, AIA-SEC. DESIGN CONFERENCE PROC. (June 2002).
30. See National Capital Planning Commission, supra note 10.
31. FLA. STAT. § 163.513(2) (2002).
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the legislation has languished for lack of funding and attention. Only two
communities, Tampa and Plantation, have taken advantage of the Act's
enabling provisions and initial funding to create Safe Neighborhood
Improvement Districts. Now enforced by the Attorney General's Office,
the Act is not a priority of the current state administration and has no
budget. As such, its implementation potential is fundamentally flawed.
Given very recent evidence that terrorist organizations, specifically al
Qaeda, have been training for years for urban attacks,32 it seems prudent
to think through the desirability of putting teeth back into this legislation
and building upon it as one vehicle to help Florida communities plan for
and deter attacks. Moreover, such legislation could be linked to existing
and newly proposed comprehensive planning and growth management
legislation, as discussed in Part VII below.
C. SituationalCrime Prevention
Of the remaining place-based crime prevention theories, situational
crime prevention provides a broad context encompassing both defensible
space and CPTED. Articulated by Ronald V. Clarke from ideas developed
while he was at the British home office in the 1960s and early 1970s,
situational crime prevention suggests that effective crime prevention
depends upon opportunity reduction. This can be accomplished by
increasing the perpetrator's risk of being seen or apprehended, by
increasing the effort required to commit a criminal act, or by decreasing
the rewards of the act.33 According to the theory, any one of these factors
may be sufficient in and of themselves to deter or prevent criminal (or, by
extension, terrorist) acts. An example of situational crime prevention
strategies at work comes from the New York City Transit Authority's
Clean Car Program.
When all other means of protecting New York's subway cars from
being defaced by graffiti artists failed, the city began interviewing those
apprehended to understand the motivations for their acts. When it was
discovered that the main reward of "tagging" was getting one's "tag"
(identification) in public view for as long as possible, the city instituted a
program that required defaced cars to be immediately removed from
service and cleaned. The effect was to dramatically reduce the incidence

32. CNN Report, tapes Show that al Qaeda Trained on Urban Jihad on West CNN.Com,
available at http://www.cnn.com/2002AJS/08/20/terror.tape.main/index.html (last visited Mar. 18,
2003). Among other things, "the [video] tapes show al Qaeda's trainees using explosives to destroy
simulated houses, office buildings, and bridges." See id.
33. See generally CLARKE, supra note 19.
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of graffiti in New York's subways. This policy has been adopted by scores
of sites around the United States, often with significant results.34 When
rewards for specific criminal acts are reduced, the number of criminal acts
focused on that reward structure tends to decline.35
While motivated by different intents and sometimes a willingness to
die for their cause, we have evidence that many terrorists are nonetheless
guided by opportunity, risk, effort, and reward. Recently, for example,
American news agencies reported, based on information and videotapes
captured in Afghanistan, that al Qaeda operatives in Indonesia were
deflected in their choice of attacks against the American Embassy in
Jakarta by the perceived risks resulting from increased physical security
surrounding the facility. 36 Israel's El Al airline, certainly an inviting target
for terrorists, has one of the best anti-terrorism safety records of any airline
in the world, due largely to Israel's investment in a multi-layered airline
defense system that presents unacceptably high risks of detection to
terrorists and similar unacceptably high costs for efforts to breach that
system.37
A safe guess would be that numerous attacks throughout the world on
high-profile targets have been thwarted for similar reasons. Indeed,
reducing the opportunities for such attacks by changing the nature, hence
the attractiveness, of the target (the reward structure), or by making a
target more difficult to approach, is a subject of current and intense debate
among a growing number of planning theorists and growth management
practitioners. These views and their implications are discussed in Part IV.
IV.

GENERAL ORIENTATIONS AND PHILOSOPHIES

Given this definitional context, some of the general philosophies
currently emerging in the growth management, planning, and design
community relative to the linkages between growth management and
terrorism tend to fall into four relatively distinct viewpoints. There is no
doubt that other views will emerge as the academic and professional study
of this area matures.
ScHNEiDER & KITCHEN, supra note 12, at 139-41.
35. See generally CLARKE, supra note 19.
36. See Terrorism Questions & Answers, available at http://www.terrorismanswers.com/
havens/indonesia.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2003).
37. Airline and airport security in Israel is the responsibility of the Israeli government. See,
e.g., Jane Black, El Al's Security Vs. The US. Approach, Bus. WK., Aug. 25, 2003, availableat
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/aug2003/nf20030825.5134_db039.htm (last visited
Nov. 21, 2003).

34.
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A. Changing the Target
One viewpoint, articulated by John Friedmann, suggests that the
potential for terrorist attack in the United States can best be reduced
through a monumental shift in planning, design and development practice
and philosophy.3" This shift effectively limits the footprint of U.S. cities,
emphasizing sustainability and green design and building practices. The
shift in emphasis could potentially reduce American consumption of such
a disproportionate share of the world's resources, consumption which may
be detrimental to developing nations, especially those in the Muslim world
who in any case perceive the United States as an arrogant, infidel exploiter
of world wealth and power. Friedmann states:
That we should act according to a global sense of responsibility in the use
of natural resources as a utopian ring. But we live in an increasingly
interdependent world. Most of the population in the belt of Islamic nations
that extends from Indonesia to the Middle East and the desert regions of
northern Africa, and is the source of our present unease, live under
conditions of unimaginable poverty. Their claims on global resources are
but a tiny fraction of ours. It is these poverty-stricken peoples
that
39
constitute the social base for the terrorist threats on our cities.
Friedmann's answer is to change the fundamental nature of the target so
as to remove its real and symbolic value to terrorists. He rejects the notion
of fleeing from terrorists by hiding behind walls or transforming the
nation's cities into fortresses.
B. Decentralizingthe Target
A second viewpoint espoused by historian Stephen Ambrose and other
planners suggests that, due to technological advances, "it is no longer
necessary to pack so many people and office [sic] into such small space as
lower Manhattan [or other large cities]. They can be scattered in
neighboring regions and states, where they can work just as efficiently and
in far more security."4 Without dealing with the philosophy of resource
equities, Ambrose argues for the diffusion of targets as a strategic response
to terrorist attack. Others, such as planner Joe Feinberg, similarly suggest
that the answer lies, in large part, in regional decentralization that will
reduce the vulnerabilities of densely packed central cities.

38. John Friedmann, City of Fear or Open City, 68 J.AM. PLAN. ASS'N 237 (2002).
39. Id. at 238.
40. Stephen Ambrose, Beware the Fury ofanArousedDemocracy,WALL ST. J., Oct. 1,2002,
at A24.
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Feinberg argues that this is the logical extension of a trend that is
already underway for business, specifically large corporations in
America. 4' Now we have the chance, he says, to reduce the daytime
concentration of population in our central cities and to reduce sprawl in
our suburban areas.42 Many American urban and suburban areas have
become unmanageable, he suggests, making traffic congestion a terrible
problem and disaster evacuation a nightmare. He links this argument with
one that emphasizes the restoration of our national railroad system. 43 This
would help reduce the terrorist vulnerability of air travel since, he says, we
are far too reliant on airline transportation. Similar to Ambrose's
argument, this view is more about moving the target and making it less
obvious to the enemy than it is about transforming the target, although the
rapid decentralization of cities would no doubt result in a transformation.
C. "Let Cities Be Cities"
A third viewpoint is diametrically opposed to those above. It is perhaps
epitomized best by Sam Casella's recent statement, "Let Cities Be
Cities ' '44 and is echoed by a large segment of planning, urban design,
growth management and anti-terrorist academics and practitioners across
the nation. Casella, President of the American Institute of Certified
Planners, argues that decentralizing development does not necessarily
offer increased security since terrorism is a dynamic threat, not limited to
tall buildings. 45 To illustrate this point, he notes "[w]e could scatter
Manhattan's population to the winds and still offer the juicy target of a
college football stadium packed with 100,000 people on a Saturday
afternoon. The answer to terrorism is eradication of terrorism, not
eradication of their targets. '"46
Casella suggests that population and industrial sprawl are dangerous
answers to terrorism since they promote too much reliance on pollution
emitting vehicles, the spread of road networks, and inefficient land-use
systems and policies; they also degrade the connectivity that humans need
with each other. Moreover, he points out that dense urban areas are the

41. See Joe Feinberg, AICP, Viewpoint, APA Web Site, available at www.planning.org/
planning/member/2002mar/viewpoint.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2003).
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See Sam Casella, FAICP, Let Cities be Cities, Viewpoint, APA Web Site, available at
www.planning.org/viewpoints/Ietcities.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2003).
45. See id.
46. Id.

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA JOURNAL OFLAW& PUBLICPOLICY

(Vol. 15

crucibles of civilization and dispersing them would not only give terrorists
a great victory, but it would not make us any safer.47
Jane Holz Kay also writes on anti-sprawl themes. She says, in response
to the reduced density proponents "Give me a break. If we're going to
continue to sprawl, and spew one-third of our global warming gases from
48
automobiles, we will be succumbing to a disaster of a different sort.
D. Hardeningthe Target
A fourth viewpoint focuses less on moving or dispersing targets and
more on target hardening, one of the oldest crime prevention strategies
generally associated with access control, a place-based crime prevention
principle. This viewpoint is perhaps best expressed in the plans developed
by an interagency task force of the National Capital Planning Commission
to increase security around the nation's monumental core area by
developing a coordinated array of aesthetically pleasing landscape
treatments and street furniture (benches, planters, seating areas, etc.) that
will nevertheless be strong enough to thwart an attack against a building
by a bomb-laden vehicle.49 This notion is somewhat akin to the "ring of
steel" philosophy that London adopted after a series of IRA bombings in
the Docklands, but which other British cities, such as Manchester, rejected
in favor of a more low-key approach." FEMA puts another face on this
general approach, within the context of mitigating what they term humancaused hazards: "Rather than removing potential victims from the hazard,
then, mitigation strategies for human-caused hazards [should] focus
primarily on creating a built environment that is difficult to attack, resilient
to consequences of an attack or accident, and protective of its occupants
should an incident occur."5
While a time-honored and effective approach to crime prevention,
target hardening has been criticized when applied to cities and regions to
defend against terrorist attacks. Aside from Friedmann, one of the most
notable critiques comes from Oscar Newman, an architect and father ofthe
aforementioned defensible space design strategies. Newman suggests that
the vast majority of anti-terrorist efforts should go into eliminating
terrorists since it would be: "far more cost effective than target hardening
and it will keep us from imprisoning ourselves and closing down that very
47. See id.
48. See APA, PlanningAfter September11, Oct. 1,2001, Dateline (quoting Jane Holz Kay),
available at www.planning.org/dateline/2001/date 10010 l.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2003).
49. See National Capital Planning Commission, supra note 10.
50. Kitchen, supra note 13, at 330.
51. IntegratingHuman-CausedHazards,supra note 8, at 3-2.
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aspect of our society that is the envy of every impoverished and
authoritarian nation in the world: its openness."52
Newman underscores his contention that almost all access control
efforts can be overcome and that these are likely to be ineffective against
terrorists, who would merely find ways around the barriers. There is no
doubt that terrorists, like ordinary criminals, are infinitely adaptable.
However, there is a growing emphasis among architects, planners, and
designers who specialize in crime prevention applications to make their
designs, ideally, one step ahead of adaptable criminals. The fundamental
concept for modem designers and planners is to think as much in terms of
the misuses of the product or property being designed as they do in terms
of its proper uses.53 The same notion applies to anti-terrorist planning and
design strategies in the design of safer cities, even if at the same time we
are pursuing more long-term, socially responsible and resource-equitable
solutions such as those proposed by Friedmann. Arguably, it could be as
foolhardy to abandon, ignore, or fail to refine place-based anti-terrorism
prevention strategies as it would be to lay down arms in the middle of a
battle while one is negotiating with the enemy.
In further response to Newman, Israeli military planners point to the
case of El Al airline's layered security perimeter.54 As of this writing, not
one suicide bombing has been perpetrated by Islamic militants living in the
Gaza Strip, a land area surrounded completely by a security fence and
associated barriers. Indeed, this access control device has been perceived
as so successful that it has been endorsed by the Israeli Parliament as a
means of protecting Israel from attack by West Bank militants. Work has
already begun on a 217 mile security corridor along the West Bank that
will ultimately include a combination of fences, walls, ditches, patrol
roads, and electronic surveillance devices.55 This is being done in the face
of critics who point out that physical means of combating terrorism
provide a temporary and imperfect fix and ignore long-term political and
economic solutions.
The basic psychological reality remains that when citizens' lives are in
jeopardy, they will grasp any solution at hand, even if it is short-term and

52. PlanningPracticeExpertAdvice, APA Web Site, Dec. 2001 (quoting Oscar Newman),
availableat www.planning.org/planningpractice/2001/dec01 .htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2003).
53. See generallyPaul Ekblom, GearingUp Against Crime:A Dynamic Frameworkto Help
Designers Keep up with the Adaptive Criminalin a Changing World, 2 INT'L J. RISK SECuRrrY &
CRIME PREVENTION 249 (1997).
54. See Black, supra note 37.
55. CNN.Com/WORLD, Israel Building Fence Along the West Bank, at http://www.cnn.
com/2002/WORLD/meast/06/17/mideast/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2003).
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shortsighted. Certainly, there can be no complete guarantee that physical
barriers, no matter how cunning and strong, or that public policies, no
matter how equitably they distribute resources, will protect us against
terrorists, whether foreign or homegrown.
Perhaps target access control and target hardening can become two of
many choices utilized for protecting people and property from all types of
harm. The real danger may be to fixate on any one choice. It is highly
unlikely that there will be a single or a simple answer to terrorism,
however skillfully we craft or resource it. Assuming that we will continue
to live in a world filled with risks and uncertainties from terrorism, how
can we best fashion our responses?

V. PLANNING FOR UNCERTAIN FUTURES: RISK ASSESSMENT

If planning is anything, it is an attempt to make uncertain futures more
certain by culling knowledge from data and applying that knowledge to
future events through present action. 6 Fundamentally, planning is a
strategy with proven survival value for our species that reduces risk and
uncertainty. There seem to be no greater and more fearsome uncertainties
than those posed by modem terrorism. Exacerbating these uncertainties are
other factors, including the adaptable nature of terrorist behavior noted
above, the great multiplicity of potential targets in our nation, and a high
level of public fear and anxiety; the mere threat of a terrorist attack can be
even more destructive and longer lasting than the attack itself.
Under normal circumstances insurance companies would be a primary
source for risk assessment techniques and approaches. However, the
September 11 attacks produced the largest single blow ever in terms of
combined insurance claims, estimated at forty to fifty billion dollars.
While liable for those claims, the insurance industry has been frantically
searching for ways to protect itself against similar catastrophic events in
the future." Recently two insurance consulting groups, AIR Worldwide
Corporation and Eqecat Corporation, have developed algorithms to assess
the probabilities and costs of an attack on any given property in any given
year. Both models have been described as "rough guides.""8 Shortly after

56. Friedmann and Hudson's definition of planning is centrally concerned with the linkage
between knowledge and organized action. See John Friedmann & Barclay Hudson, Knowledge and
Action: A Guide to PlanningTheory, 40 A.I.P. J. 2-3 (1974).
57. See Joseph B. Treaster, The Race to Predict Terror's Costs, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 1, 2002,
§ 3 at 1.
58. Id.
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the one-year anniversary of September 11, these proprietary programs
were made available to insurance companies. 9
First, we know that we cannot guard against every risk. Rather we must
protect ourselves based on a prioritization of risks by measuring the
probabilities that different sets of targets may be more or less attractive to
terrorists than other targets. Even though the infrequency of terrorist
attacks within, the United States makes statistical analysis impossible, we
know from worldwide experience that some targets are indeed more
attractive than others based upon the expected rewards terrorists hope to
gain. As damage to buildings or sites of high symbolic value (e.g., the
Washington Monument) or critical infrastructure (e.g., Hoover Dam)
moves along a scale of intensity from negligible to catastrophic, the
attractiveness of the reward also increases.6"
Further, if the probability of achieving the maximum reward
(catastrophic damage) is also high, then we can say that this is a site or
building that we must protect with maximum available resources. The
Rand Corporation's "Risk Reduction Matrix"'" illustrates this combination
of factors, although "vulnerability" is substituted for "effort and risk."
Vulnerability is largely a function of the ease of building or site
accessibility. The objective of effective anti-terrorist planning is to reduce
vulnerability (i.e., by reducing opportunity through increased risk and
effort) and lessen the severity of the consequences (i.e., by reducing the
reward structure through mitigation efforts).
Rand's risk assessment scheme draws upon the U.S. General Services
Administration's risk evaluation algorithm devised for all new
construction of federal buildings under its domain and for the
modernization of existing federal buildings.62 The system takes into
account the size of the facility, the number of employees, the structure's
rating of critical importance, its symbolic value, and the consequences of
the attack.

59. Lynna Goch, Loss/Risk Management Notes: Terrorism Models Can Help Insurers,
BEST'S REVIEW, Nov. 2002, availableat http://www.absconsulting.com/news/EQECAT.pdf (last
visited Nov. 21, 2003).
60. Two other classic aims of terrorist attack are to inflict mass casualties and to take
hostages. One result of the September 11 attack was to add the infliction of mass economic harm
to this list. See, e.g., Robert Shapiro, AI-Qaida and the GDP, MSN Slate, available at
http://slate.msn.com/id/2079298 (last visited Nov. 21,2003).
61. See RAE W. ARCHIBALD ET AL., SECURITY AND SAFETY IN Los ANGELES HIGH-RISE
BUILDINGS AFTER 9/11, 15-20 (2002), available at www.rand.org/publications/DB/DB381 (last
visited Nov. 21, 2003).
62. General Services Administration, Public Building Service Security Criteria (Jan. 1997).
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This, in conjunction with a detailed site evaluation, provides
information to assign any federal building one of five protection levels,
each of which carries with it a series of related protective strategies, from
increased mechanical access control security (such as the provision of
delta barricades, mechanically operated vehicle impediments), to increased
electronic surveillance and guardianship. The highest threat assigned to
any facility is E level, which means that an extreme level of protection is
warranted. For instance, the White House merits E level protection.
As noted in the Capital National Planning Commission's report for
security design in Washington, D.C.:
Not all buildings and facilities require the same level of security. The
Interagency Security Committee, a group examining federal security
responses, circulated design criteria to federal agencies in May 2000.
These criteria and responses form the basis of the current federal policies
and guidelines for assessing security risks. Buildings are assigned a
"protection level" based on factors that include symbolic importance,
critical nature of operations, consequences of an attack, and surrounding
site conditions. This approach, used in conjunction with a detailed risk
assessment, identifies the appropriate level of protective measures to be
applied to any federal facility. Concerned that agencies may have a natural
tendency to elevate the require level of protection and to over-design
security, the National Capital Planning Commission recommends that the
federal government develop a protocol similar to that used by the General
Services Administration for agencies under its jurisdiction be taken to
enhance facility security and blast resistance.63
GSA's threat assessment algorithm is tied to the specific nature of the
possible attack (here from a vehicle carrying a bomb, which is the most
common delivery method against American targets) and suggests
countermeasures that are known to be effective in these circumstances. In
this case, increased standoff distances (the distance allowed between
curbside parked or driven vehicles from the building's facade) and
physical access control devices, which may include a wide range of
constructed barriers, are primary protective devices. Risk assessment
strategies are applied by the Commission and these result in a
comprehensive range of site and urban design countermeasures that are
being suggested for the city's designated monumental core area.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) offers a stepby-step human hazards planning and risk assessment approach for local
communities that is designed to be compatible with local planning efforts.

63. National Capital Planning Commission, supra note 10, at 9.
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Indeed, the agency said at the outset of its most recent publication on the
subject "If your community has begun developing or updating its
comprehensive plan, capital improvement plan, urban design guidelines,
land development regulations, growth management or sustainability plans,
or other community-oriented guidance, this is a prime opportunity to
incorporate planning for human-caused disasters."64
FEMA's process involves four basic mitigation planning steps: 1)
Organizing Resources, 2) Assessing Risks, 3) Developing a Mitigation
Plan, and 4) Plan Implementation.65 The second step, Risk Assessment, is
divided into four phases: identifying potential hazards, inventorying assets,
providing a profile of hazard events, and estimating losses. Each of these
is further subdivided into logical elements that provide specific how-to
instructions for local officials in terms of preventing, responding to, and
mitigating the effects of human-caused hazards. Guidance in the
prioritization of assets (specific facilities, sites, systems, or other locations
that could potentially be targeted for attack)66 is a central feature of
FEMA's advice in this regard. Much of their advice parallels the Rand
Risk Reduction Matrix noted above. FEMA's risk assessment approach is
accompanied by a discussion of probabilities and cost-benefit factors that
guide the viability of prevention and mitigation efforts:
The frequency factor is much more complex in the case of human-caused
hazards than for natural hazards. While it is possible to estimate how
many natural disasters will occur (for example, a structure located in the
100-year flood plain is considered to have a 1 percent chance of being
flooded in any given year), it is very difficult to quantify the likelihood of
a terrorist attack or technological disaster. Quantitative methods to
estimate these probabilities are being developed but have not yet been
refined to the point where they can be used to determine incident
probability on a facility-by-facility basis. Therefore, the planning team
must use a qualitative approach based on threat and vulnerability
considerations to estimate the relative likelihood of an attack or accident
rather than the precise frequency. Such an approach is necessarily
subjective but can be combined with quantitative estimates of costeffectiveness (the cost of a measure compared to the value of the lives and

64. IntegratingHuman-CausedHazards,supranote 8, at 1-3. The agency is very concerned
that most state and local governments, including Florida, have no mandatory, comprehensive, and
coordinated approach to human caused hazard mitigation that connects with ongoing planning
efforts. See generally id.

65. Id. at 2-1.
66. Id. at 2-7.
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property it saves in a worst-case scenario) to help illustrate the overall risk
reduction achieved by a particular mitigation measure.67
Thus, the planning team may determine that the pipe bombing of a
courthouse is probably more likely than the paramilitary assault of a
shopping mall, and base its mitigation priorities in part on this assessment.
Despite the subjective nature of this process, it does comport with a
commonsense understanding of not only the assets, but also the political,
social, and economic forces within a jurisdiction.
Quantitative shortcomings notwithstanding, FEMA provides an
extensive list of Terrorism and Technological Hazard Mitigation Measures
that cover site planning and landscape design (CPTED implementation),
architectural and interior space planning, structural engineering,
mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, fire protection engineering,
security, and parking.6" There are tools available, imperfect as they may
be, to aid planners, as well as state and local officials, in coping with the
uncertainty and risk of a terrorist attack.

VI. WHY INCORPORATE ANTI-TERRORISM PLANNING INTO GROWTH
MANAGEMENT AND COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING IN FLORIDA?

There are four primary reasons why state and local comprehensive
planning and growth management policies and regulations should include
anti-terrorism planning provisions. First, based on evidence and
experience, place-based crime prevention planning can be effective in
preventing and deterring crimes by reducing opportunities for such action
through increasing risks, reducing rewards, and increasing efforts to obtain
those rewards. Moreover, emerging evidence indicates that such
techniques can also be effective against terrorism.69 Although such
activities may only prevent or deter a relatively small number of criminal
or terrorist incidents, they are nevertheless valuable additions to our menu
of defensive techniques. Florida has already begun to acknowledge the
value of place-based crime prevention activities through the Safe
Neighborhood Act,7" even though funding and implementation of the Act
has been less than stellar.
Second, planners have access to a vast array of essential information
concerning land, real property, and land uses, and are more likely than

67.
68.
69.
70.

See id. at 3-3 - 3-7.
Id. at 3-5.
National Capital Planning Commission, supra note 10.
See generally FLA. STAT. § 163.502 (2002).
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other local and regional agency staffs to employ cutting edge computer
technology such as geographic- information systems (GIS) and related
computer modeling techniques to keep track of that data. These extremely
valuable tools are presently being used by planners to identify and map
infrastructure of all types and they can easily be adapted to locate and map
potential targets as well. These tools lend themselves to cataloging
development that alters the physical landscape - certainly a rapidly
changing picture in urbanized Florida7 - and can be indispensable for
tracking terrorist threats by location, type of facility, and threatened
adjacencies. Further, planners are already plugged into day-to-day
development activities and into the network of agencies and individuals
dealing with planning and development issues and are thus better
positioned than other government officials to access information and
personal networks that can mitigate the effects of a terrorist attack by,
among other things, reducing property loss.
Further, there is tangential evidence that when hazard elements are
included in local comprehensive plans, community property losses can be
significantly reduced. The same effect can be accomplished relative to the
inclusion of human-caused hazard (anti-terrorism) planning in local and
regional level comprehensive planning. Steinberg and Burby report a
University of North Carolina study finding that
appropriate land-use measures could reduce expected property losses by
one-third over the next 50 years ... in all cases maximum savings can

only be realized if local comprehensive plans contribute to the effort.
When local plans include hazard safety policies, it is easier to
implement the relevant zoning ordinances and building code
requirements. It is also easier to keep everyone informed about natural
hazards and their risks, including municipal departments, developers, and
the public.72

Third, since the interconnected web of legislation that spells out
comprehensive planning and growth management is the fundamental law
governing all public and private development in Florida,73 this is the
appropriate locus for the inclusion of place-based terrorist prevention
strategies, particularly those mandating that jurisdictions implement risk
assessment evaluations for critical infrastructure and other potential
targets. Indeed, anti-terrorism planning that seeks to affect land

71. See, e.g., GeoPlan Center Web Site, at http://www. geoplan.ufl.edu/ (last visited Oct. 27,
2003).
72. MICHELE STEINBERG & RAYMOND J. BuRBY, GROWING SAFE PLANNING 22-23 (Apr.
2002).
73.

See generally FLA. STAT. § 163.3161(5) (2002).
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development practices and urban design (by creating special districts or
zones, redesigning local streets, and providing designs for hardening street
furniture) is more sensibly connected to the state's existing land planning
and growth management legislation, specifically the State's
Comprehensive Plan,74 and the Local Government Comprehensive
Planning and Land Development Regulation Act,75 than to other
legislation, even that dealing with emergency management. This is so
despite the cogent arguments recently raised by Tom Pelham, that the
existing comprehensive planning and growth management legislation has
been subverted by the state's unwillingness to properly fund or implement
key provisions, especially those pertaining to concurrency and to regional
planning, directly resulting in urban sprawl and the mismanagement of
growth. 76 Among other things, Pelham argues forcefully for a restructured
growth management system that provides a better defined State
Comprehensive Plan such that the state will live up to its stated aims and
decrease oversight of local plan review, shifting more power to regional
planning councils.77
Fourth, the incorporation of anti-terrorism planning into the existing
planning, legal, policy, and operational frameworks is more efficient than
creating entirely new legislation or new operational staffs. This is
particularly important in terms of post-attack response and regeneration,
as distinguished from urban design changes that harden targets or that
deflect attacks through other opportunity reducing measures. The
experience of the city of Manchester, England illustrates this issue.
Manchester, one of England's largest cities, was bombed by the IRA
in June 1996, an attack that destroyed or badly damaged more than a half
million square feet of retail floor space in the city center.78 Although that
nation has been the target of scores of such attacks over the past four
decades, this assault stood out as the largest peacetime bombing ever in
mainland Britain.79 The effect of the bombing was not only to destroy
public and private property, but to devastate business in the city's
downtown, a center for particularly small businesses with little fall back
resources. The bombing also severely disrupted transportation networks

74. See generally FLA. STAT. ch. 187 (2002).
75. FLA. STAT. ch. 163, pt. 11 (2002).
76. See generally Pelham, supra note 7.
77. Id.at 309. Pelham also suggests that the state should build upon its experimentation with
transportation concurrency exemption areas. In the end, all of this depends on having the political
will to make these things work. Id. at 309-10.
78. Kitchen, supra note 13.
79. Id. at 327.
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and badly shook public confidence in this critical area of the city, the heart
of its shopping district. The long-term economic fallout of the bombing
promised to be just as serious as the property loss, similar to the effect that
the September 11 attacks have had on the American airline industry. The
essence of the Manchester experience was that the response mechanism for
rebuilding the city center was crafted from existing planning law and
policy, rather than from new legislation or from that in other functional
policy areas. As Kitchen points out:
the primary benefits of an interpretation by the local planning authority
that its existing development plan framework was adequate for the
purpose of shaping the redevelopment process were that no new planning
actions had to undertaken and no new by-laws or similar powers had to be
sought before the recovery process could get underway, thus saving the
time (and no doubt also the public debate) that these processes would
have involved."0
The fact that regeneration of the city center grew out of the existing
planning context and policy meant that existing public-private partnerships
were more easily harnessed for the vast effort required to rebuild the center
and reintegrate it into the fabric of the city once more. Moreover, the city's
planning information systems were invaluable in accurately assessing
business losses and locating housing for displaced residents.8 As a result,
Manchester restored its city center with minimum delay, which was
essential to the restoration of faith and confidence in its downtown core.
Furthermore, the speedy response helped to greatly diminish citizens'
fears, an enormously important and often underemphasized by-product of
such disasters.

VII. WHERE DOES ANTI-TERRORISM PLANNING FIT INTO
EXISTING FLORIDA LEGISLATION?

A restructured, better articulated, and invigorated State Comprehensive
Plan should include a clear anti-terrorism planning goal statement. The
statement should specify that local governments complete asset inventories
and risk assessment processes. These might be modeled along the lines of
those suggested in this paper, although there are certainly other models to
choose from.
Moreover, to promote planning consistency, the Local Government
Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act should

80. Id. at 336.
81. Id. at 337-39.
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include provisions, within the context of its required and optional elements
of comprehensive plans,82 that mandate jurisdictions to develop asset
inventories and associated risk assessment 'processes to identify critical
infrastructure, critical protection zones, and vulnerable targets subject to
catastrophic damage from terrorist attack. Such provisions might be
accomplished through the inclusion of an entirely new mandatory element
that replaces the existing weak language of Florida Statute sections
163.3177(7)(h) and (i), providing for optional safety elements from
"manmade or natural catastrophe" and encouraginglocal governments that
are not subject to coastal management elements to adopt hazard mitigation
post disaster redevelopment plans (emphasis supplied). 3
In the alternative to adopting an entirely new anti-terrorism element,
existing provisions of section 163.3177(6)(a) of the Florida Statutes,
dealing with future land use, could be modified to provide for future land
use maps that identify and depict areas designated by an accepted risk
assessment process as "critical protection zones." The statute could then
outline reasonable preventive measures for these zones. One model for
such a process and for possible street level design anti-terrorism
countermeasures may be the National Capital Planning Commission's plan
for Washington, D.C., as discussed previously.
Further modifications could be applied to section 163.3177(6)(b),
dealing with the required transportation circulation element, providing for
a risk assessment and countermeasure design process for those portions of
the transportation infrastructure identified as critical. Section
163.3177(6)(d), dealing with water conservation, could also be modified
to focus specifically on risk assessment for critical water recharge areas,
including rivers, bays, and lakes. Attention could also be given to section
163.3177(10) which focuses on the preservation of historic and
archaeological resources.8 4
In the case of section 163.3177(10), it is important that sites of high
symbolic value should be protected by appropriate design and planning
techniques. The National Capital Planning Commission's plans are
instructive for these purposes. In this context, it is also clear that some of
Florida's public buildings and related facilities are obvious targets such
that section 163.3177(e) should be amended to include appropriate risk
assessment requirements for these structures. Consideration should be
given as to how best to include adjacent land uses that may also be
threatened. Here too, changes should be made to section 163.3177(7)(f),
82. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177 (2002).
83. Id.
84. Id.
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the recommended community design element, to provide for anti-terrorist
design strategies based on the emerging national models noted above.
The inclusion of language that identifies and protects the state's critical
infrastructure is essential. It is clear that capital improvement planning is
central to section 163.3161 of the Florida Statutes generally and is a
critical element specific to section 163.3177. Therefore, the legislation
requires provisions for the asset inventory of both public and private
infrastructure and the development of concomitant risk analysis and
preventive design plans.
The above recommendations are not exhaustive, but they are a start.
Moreover, this Essay has not explored their ramifications relative to
administrative review processes, 8 5 or to the concurrency implications,
which are bound to be huge. Those topics are the subject of further
research and will almost certainly be on the agenda of those who see the
value of incorporating anti-terrorism planning into ongoing comprehensive
planning and growth management in Florida and elsewhere.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Anti-terrorism planning, as it is emerging from place-based crime
prevention planning, has a legitimate place among prevention and response
tools that Florida (and indeed the nation) should have on the menu of
available defense and mitigation techniques in the war against terrorism.
Certainly these are not the only tools, nor are they guaranteed to be
effective in every instance, but there is evidence that they can work and,
artfully applied, will not harden the urban landscape so as to turn our cities
into fortresses. Further, such planning and urban design provisions should
be incorporated into existing growth management and comprehensive
planning legislation in Florida, especially the State Comprehensive Plan
and the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land
Development Regulation Act.
These laws, no matter how poorly funded or implemented, nevertheless
provide the fundamental direction for local, regional, and state policy and
practice relative to all public and private development. Beyond the laws
themselves, the incorporation of anti-terrorism planning into
comprehensive planning highlights this issue to those local, regional, and
state agencies and officials that have access to a vast amount of data and
data management techniques that are essential to both preventive planning
design, and even more significantly in the case of attack, to response

85. See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.001 (2000).
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mechanisms and networks. These mechanisms and networks can mitigate
the effects of terrorist attacks through the reduction of recovery times, the
reduction of public fear, and ultimately the restoration of public
confidence.

